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1. Introduction 
In this article we raise a problem, and we offer two practical contributions to its 
solution. The problem is that academic communities interested in digital publishing 
do not have adequate tools to help them in choosing a publishing model that suits 
their needs. We believe that excessive focus on Open Access (OA) has obscured some 
important issues; moreover exclusive emphasis on increasing openness has 
contributed to an agenda and to policies that show clear practical shortcomings. We 
believe that academic communities have different needs and priorities; therefore there 
cannot be a ranking of publishing models that fits all and is based on only one 
criterion or value.  We thus believe that two things are needed. First, communities 
need help in working out what they want from their digital publications. Their needs 
and desiderata should be made explicit and their relative importance estimated. This 
exercise leads to the formulation and ordering of their objectives. Second, available 
publishing models should be assessed on the basis of these objectives, so as to choose 
one that satisfies them well. Accordingly we have developed a framework that assists 
communities in going through these two steps. The framework can be used 
informally, as a guide to the collection and systematic organization of the information 
needed to make an informed choice of publishing model. In order to do so it maps the 
values that should be weighed and the technical features that embed them.  
Building on our framework, we also offer a method to produce ordinal and cardinal 
scores of publishing models. When these techniques are applied the framework 
becomes a formal decision–making tool. 
Finally, the framework stresses that, while the OA movement tackles important issues 
in digital publishing, it cannot incorporate the whole range of values and interests that 
are at the core of academic publishing. Therefore the framework suggests a broader 
agenda that is relevant in making better policy decisions around academic publishing 
and OA. 
 
2. Our experience with Open Access 
Our engagement with OA originates in our experience of working within the Agora 
project.1 What struck our attention and pushed us to inquiry into the driving reasons 
behind OA was the experience of the Nordic Wittgenstein Review (NWR), a new 
journal that was launched by the Nordic Wittgenstein Society under the auspices of 
the Agora project.2 The focus in our project was to explore new business models for 
public–private partnerships in philosophical publishing. The journal adopted a 
delayed dual–mode (print and electronic) model, consisting of a subscription–based 
print version with a three month embargo on a free online version. The copyright 
license adopted for published material was CC–BY–NC–SA, which requires 
attribution to the author, forbids commercial use, and requires that any derivative 
work using it be distributed under the same license as the original.3 The choice of the 
delayed dual–mode model and of the licensing type was made in the attempt to meet 
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the needs and preferences of the communities that the journal addresses (Wittgenstein 
scholars and analytical philosophers) while taking advantage of a partnership with a 
small publisher (Ontos Verlag).4 Furthermore, both the publishing model and the 
licensing represent the removal of considerable barriers compared to the ‘traditional’ 
mode of publication for academic journals. Free availability on the internet 3 months 
after print publication and the right to use, copy, store, reprint, circulate, build on etc. 
certainly represent a major increase in openness as compared to the benchmark. Yet, 
both the delayed dual–mode model and licensing type adopted caused problems with 
the institutions that are supposed to assist and promote OA: the Directory of Open 
Access Journals (DOAJ) refused to index the NWR, because of the delay to OA, 
while the Open Access Scholarly Publishers Association (OASPA) denied 
membership to the journal, on account of the fact that the journal uses a license more 
restrictive than the minimal CC–BY.5 These refusals obviously affect the journal 
negatively: it loses visibility and access to useful services. We felt that these 
closures—these barriers, if we may—suffered by the NWR were the symptom that 
something was wrong and in need of further analysis. 
 
3. From OA to a publishing values analysis 
Digital technologies offer many interesting opportunities in scientific and scholarly 
publishing and are currently driving important changes in publishing culture and 
practices. So far the discourse around digital academic publishing has been dominated 
by the theme of OA.6 The OA agenda no doubt addresses some fundamental issues 
associated with the new opportunities offered by digital media. While we 
acknowledge the importance of the issues tackled by the OA movement, we believe 
that it is wrong to frame the choices faced by journal promoters exclusively in terms 
of OA. There are important opportunities in digital publishing that are not captured by 
the ideas of open access and open use.7 For instance journals published in digital 
format only (i.e. with no print version) allow for the possibility of publishing a greater 
number of articles and to publish them much more quickly. Since long waiting time 
between acceptance and publication is a problem for authors, this is no doubt an 
important possibility afforded by digital publishing models.  
Furthermore, there is a regrettable trend to adopt a simplistic opposition between 
‘open’ and ‘closed’ and to equate ‘open’ with ‘good’ and ‘closed’ with ‘bad’. A 
moment of reflection on the concept of barrier (i.e. what the quest for openness aims 
to remove) is enough to show why that value judgment is unwarranted. Barriers as 
such are neither good nor bad. Barriers protect and exclude. The desirability or 
justifiability of barriers depends on who or what they protect, on who or what they 
exclude, and on the conditions required for lifting them. This is unfortunately a 
complexity that has been lost in most visions of OA. An assumption that barriers are 
hindrances and limitations of freedom is often at work, but not discussed explicitly. 
Similarly and symmetrically, the idea that openness is good and progressive is equally 
uncritically assumed. We will see that some barriers are desirable and justifiable and 
hence the evaluative opposition between open and closed is misleading.8 
Nevertheless, advocates of OA are right in claiming that there are barriers to the 
circulation and use of knowledge that do not serve any value and that these can and 
should now be removed. But trying to remove these specific and unjustified barriers is 
different from a vague attempt to maximize openness.9 
Another problem with the OA movement is that definitions of OA are not merely 
theoretical contributions, they are features of a practical agenda and in fact they create 
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reality. There are two types of realities that are shaped by definitions of OA: 1) 
examples of actual OA publications —that are often designed so as to conform to a 
given definition, and 2) services and infrastructures for OA —that typically 
operationalize a given definition. As mentioned in the previous section, we have 
learned through our experience that the latter can generate barriers and be 
exclusionary towards publication models that serve some academic communities and 
their public well.  
We have thus come to the conclusion that instead of thinking in terms of openness we 
need to map the values and interests that can be promoted or thwarted through the 
adoption of different publishing models. This value analysis can be useful in different 
contexts, for instance we think it should help current discussions around the 
opportunity of OA mandates to see the issue within the broader context of academic 
publishing and its values. It can also provide the background for normative arguments 
and policy recommendations. For instance it helps in explaining why the influential 
Budapest OA definition is too demanding and is blind to important considerations, as 
we discovered in our experience with the Agora project. To give another example, our 
value analysis helps to understand the discontent—widespread in the humanities—
towards Article Processing Charges, for it shows that they go against what we call fair 
access to publishing.10 
However, in this paper we consider the problem mainly from the point of view of the 
group of people involved in launching a new journal or in moving an existing journal 
to a different publishing model. We will call the group of people involved in steering 
or founding the journal the promoters. We hope to offer to the promoters a framework 
that helps them in making their publishing objectives explicit and in assessing which 
available publishing models satisfy them. We aim at helping journal promoters to find 
the right balance between the various desiderata pursued by academic publishing, 
some of which are overlooked in the OA discourse. 
 
4. The choice faced by journal promoters 
Typically the promoters are a group of scholars or scientists, but they may include 
other stakeholders. Several disciplines have journals that are not addressed to an 
exclusively academic audience; for instance engineering, medicine, business, 
planning and architecture, organization theory and public administration science etc. 
Representatives from the professions that access and use these kinds of knowledge 
may very well be among the promoters of academic journals. We do not include in 
our definitions of promoters those who have an exclusively economic interest in the 
profit that the journal may generate. This qualification is aimed at including the 
interests of learned societies that also have an interest in generating some revenues, 
while excluding the interests of so–called predatory publishers and of publishers that 
see journals only in terms of profit.11  
Promoters may have many different reasons for wishing for a new journal or a new 
publication model. Promoters of a new journal may want to fill a gap in the existing 
range of journals and launch one that serves a new discipline, or field of studies. Or 
they may simply want to provide another publication option to a scholarly community 
that is growing or that is not currently finding enough publication outlets. But they 
may also be interested in journals that meet the needs of a broader audience of 
professionals or educated readers. Promoters of a new publication model may be 
trying to save a journal that is struggling to survive, or they may want to offer better 
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service to their authors and readers. Whatever the reasons of the promoters may be, 
they all need to face 3 key questions: 
 
Table 1: Promoters' fundamental questions 
How can we find the 
financial resources for 
running the journal 
regularly? 
 
 ê 
Financial sustainability 
How can we gain the 
support of authors, 
reviewers, readers etc.? 
 
 
 ê 
Community sustainability 
How can we know which 
publishing options best 
suit our objectives? 
 
 
ê 
Worthiness12 
 
 
In order for a journal to be successful, all three questions need to find a satisfying 
answer. That means that they all point to conditions that have to be satisfied for the 
journal to be successful—they are necessary conditions, but none is in itself 
sufficient. The task is therefore to help promoters to single out the publishing 
model(s) that meet all three conditions (stated in bold at the bottom of the table). Of 
course it may well be the case that no available publishing model meets this objective. 
When this is the case, the promoters’ plan needs either to be abandoned or to be 
revised in more realistic terms. 
The following diagram illustrates the set of necessary conditions and the way they 
may overlap. 
 
Table 2: Necessary conditions for the success of a journal 
 
All the subsets in the figure (D, E, F and G) are also part of the larger sets. So for 
instance every member d of D is at the same time a member of A and B, and every 
member g of G is at the same time a member of A, B, C, D, E and F.  
Table 2 illustrates the point we have made above: we want to help promoters to find 
out which publishing models (if any) populate set G. Set G includes the publishing 
options that satisfy the conditions of financial sustainability, community sustainability 
and worthiness. If G is populated by at least one member, the effort of the promoters 
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has a point;if it is empty their current wishes and needs cannot be met. If more than 
one model populates G, then the promoters have an interest in understanding in which 
respects these models differ and whether any of them is significantly better than the 
others.  
 
5. Defining the aim of the framework for evaluating 
publishing models 
Our framework will focus on 2 of the 3 necessary conditions that we have 
highlighted, namely community sustainability and worthiness. We assume that the 
tools and know–how to make a financial sustainability assessment already exist. Thus 
we focus on the less familiar tasks of carrying out an assessment of community 
sustainability and of worthiness. We will treat the two issues together, because many 
factors that contribute to the satisfaction of one condition contribute to the satisfaction 
of the other as well. This happens because typically the promoters are a subset of the 
community whose support is needed and hence there is a substantial overlap in 
purposes and needs.  
We can define as the key stakeholders, those groups whose support is needed in order 
for the journal to exist: for instance authors, reviewers, editors, readers, funders etc. If 
the journal does not consider and satisfy the needs, interests and values of key 
stakeholders it will lose their support and will be unable to survive. This is the idea 
captured by the concept of community sustainability. By contrast, we define 
worthiness as the ability to satisfy the promoters’ objectives (is the journal bringing 
enough added value to the current publishing situation to be worth the effort to 
promote it?).13 At a closer look we can see that typically promoters will also be 
authors, reviewers, editors and readers of the journal, so they are not an altogether 
different bunch of people. To be sure, as promoters they are playing a more specific 
role and hence they can be analytically distinguished, but still they continue to share 
many needs, aspirations and values with those members of the scholarly community 
that they serve.  
In short, we believe that there is enough convergence between community’s needs 
and promoters’ objectives to justify treating them together in constructing our list of 
desiderata that publishing models should satisfy.14  
 
Table : The convergence between the interests of the community of contributors and readers, and the 
interests of the journal promoters: subset E
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6. Mapping the values to be built into the framework 
 
Table 4: Values relevant to academic publishing 
 
 
Core values 
 
 
Advancement of 
knowledge 
Scholarly virtues (accuracy, originality, 
intellectual honesty etc.) 
Efficiency (in the production and 
dissemination of knowledge) 
 
Fairness 
Fair equality of 
opportunity 
Desert rewarded 
 
Additional values 
(whose relevance and 
applicability needs to 
be assessed for each 
research domain) 
Philanthropic 
values 
Human development 
Human wellbeing 
Democratic 
values 
Democratic participation 
Democratic accountability 
Democratic empowerment 
 
There are two main ways for mapping the values involved in academic publishing: 1) 
a functional analysis of its purposes, and 2) stakeholders analysis. Here we focus 
mainly on the former, because it turned out that it is the one that points to the core 
values of academic publishing. Stakeholders analysis has produced important positive 
results when focused at scientists and scholars, and at public opinion and humanity. 
When directed at other stakeholders—namely publishers, librarians and funders—it 
has not revealed any further value (see Appendix). 
 
6.1 Functional analysis 
Academic publishing nowadays performs two different functions: 
1. it promotes the advancement and sharing of knowledge;15 
2. it provides the information necessary to assess the performance and merit of 
researchers.  
Arguably the second function is subsidiary because academic publishing provides a 
reasonably reliable indication of the quality of researchers only if it is actually 
organized around the purpose of promoting knowledge efficiently—it could not 
perform this function if, say, its aim was to make profit or to boost the self–esteem of 
all researchers. But even if we acknowledge that one function is conditional to the 
successful performance of the other, it is nonetheless very important not to dismiss 
the second function and its implications.  
The first function implies two values: knowledge and efficiency. The value of 
knowledge is too well established to require a justification here.16 Efficiency is 
necessary in order to achieve as much knowledge as possible and to disseminate it as 
widely as possible. If we accept that knowledge is valuable and that the more of it the 
better, then efficiency in its pursuit and circulation is an effective way of having more 
of the desired goal. The assumption that having more knowledge is better does not 
need to be true for individuals (it is perfectly plausible to believe that pursuing 
Those indicated as core values in table 4 should always be considered very carefully and given high 
importance. What we have indicated as additional values are no doubt of great importance, but the 
actual impact of research on them is highly variable. Therefore it is up to the promoters to ask 
themselves how their discipline or research area affects them and how much weight should be given 
to them. 
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knowledge beyond a certain point produces an unbalanced personality), but from a 
collective point of view: the advancement of learning provides a pool from which 
people can draw if and when they have a need or desire for knowledge. 
There is a second argument in support of efficiency in the advancement of 
knowledge. If we pursue knowledge efficiently we can minimize the opportunity 
costs of our quest for knowledge. If we admit that there are other valuable things that 
can be pursued and that research needs resources, then efficiency is always a way of 
minimizing opportunity costs, i.e. the things that we have to give up or sacrifice in 
order to have something we have chosen (in this case knowledge). This expresses not 
only a commitment to knowledge but also a sense of social responsibility and of 
respect for other values. Indeed, the case for efficiency becomes stronger if we see it 
as a rejection of wastefulness out of respect for valuable things.  
Although knowledge and efficiency are two analytically distinct values, for our 
present purpose we can lump them together under the label of efficiency in the 
generation and sharing of knowledge.  
Now we need to turn to the second function that we have attributed to academic 
publishing: providing an indicator of the productivity of scholars and scientists, and 
hence of their professional achievements (i.e. merit). Academic careers are not open 
to everyone, rather they can be considered ‘merit’ careers: i.e. careers in limited 
supply and reserved for those able to contribute to excellence. Accordingly, there are 
restrictions in access and advances, as well as hierarchical structures that determine 
not only the success of their career, but also their chances of getting the resources 
necessary to carry out first class research and of disseminating their findings. Let us 
assume that in light of the value of efficiency and of some plausible assumptions 
about limited resources, competition and hierarchy are necessary. This leads to a 
situation in which scientists and scholars are in a relation of both collaboration and 
competition. This creates a tension, which can be handled and reconciled (at least up 
to a point that guarantees a reasonably stable equilibrium) only through the operation 
of another important value: fairness. Fairness here has to be understood both as fair 
equality of opportunities and as proportionality between merit and rewards.17 
These are the conditions that make competition acceptable and that allow 
collaboration among scientists and scholars who are also in a competitive 
relationship. Like in sport, fair play is necessary in science and scholarship. Therefore 
on account of its fundamental role as an indicator of researchers’ merit and 
productivity, academic publishing needs to incorporate and express the value of 
fairness. Without fairness in access to publishing opportunities and fairness in 
evaluating publications, publishing could not be a reliable indicator of desert and 
hence it would undermine the reliability of the whole mechanism of recruitment and 
career advancement. This in turn would have an enormous detrimental effect on 
efficiency in the production of knowledge. So here we have a first argument asserting 
the value of fairness as a necessary means to pursue knowledge efficiently. 
While academic publishing is an activity with its own goals and functions, it is not 
exempt from more general moral principles—whether these are universal or relative 
to a specific society does not matter for our present purpose. Such broader ethical 
notions provide the boundaries within which the ethical norms of any particular 
professional activity (like academic research and publishing) have to operate. These 
wider social norms include a principle of fairness, which is often derived from a basic 
value—the dignity of the individual—and from the principle of respect for persons—
which is often assumed as a normative axiom. When this and other ethical constraints 
are satisfied, the pursuit of the goals of the activity and of the goods associated with 
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success in such a pursuit are perfectly legitimate individual interests. We can thus 
construct the following argument starting from the legitimate interests of researchers 
and a general principle of fairness. 
Normative premises: 
• Researchers are entitled to pursue success and recognition in their field. 
• Researchers have a legitimate demand that success and recognition are 
allocated on the basis of actual individual desert. 
Factual premise: 
• Success and recognition in knowledge production are measured by the quality 
and quantity of academic publications. 
From these premises two conclusions follow: 
i. the quantity of academic publications ought to be determined by 
scientific and scholarly criteria alone (namely efficiency in the 
production of knowledge)—this is equivalent to fair equality of 
opportunities;  
ii. the quality of academic publications should be measured as accurately 
as possible—this is a condition for achieving proportionality between 
merit and rewards. 
The principles of fairness justified as instrumental in the efficient pursuit of 
knowledge are thus confirmed by the argument derived from the legitimate individual 
interests of researchers. 
 
6.2 Stakeholders analysis 
Let us now look at the stakeholders involved in the process of academic publishing. 
We can first look at them as a broad group: scientists and scholars. Taken collectively 
we can assume that they have (or at least that they should have) a commitment to the 
value of knowledge and of efficiency in its pursuit. This commitment brings with it 
some interesting implications: namely the further commitment to the ethos and values 
required by the effective performance of their tasks. Being devoted to knowledge and 
truth means to endorse values like accuracy, sincerity, honesty, trustworthiness, 
originality and a certain degree of collaborative spirit. Such values (or more detailed 
lists of discipline–specific values) constitute the scholarly ethos and are embodied in 
scholarly virtues. 
Let us now have a look at the impact of research on the larger public, or, if you prefer, 
on humankind. Two kinds of arguments seem to us to have some relevance and 
validity. The first claims that access to knowledge promotes human development.18 
The argument has two versions: one considers the impact of knowledge on societies 
and the other on individuals. The first is based on the assumption that knowledge has 
great instrumental value and its growth has positive effects on society: it promotes 
economic and social innovation, good health, education, intelligence, creativity, 
productivity and competitiveness. In short, knowledge promotes the growth of 
society.19 The second version maintains that knowledge enriches the life of 
individuals and makes it more full and enjoyable.20 
The second argument is that knowledge, like information, is necessary in order to 
empower a democratic citizenship to assess government and public policies, as well 
as in order to enable a full development of public discussion and public 
deliberation.21 
We believe that these arguments have some plausibility and force. It would be hard to 
understand why societies invest so much in research if such claims were ungrounded. 
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However, we also think that it is very important to consider these values in relation to 
specific kinds of knowledge, for there can be little doubt that different kinds of 
knowledge have quite different impact on human well–being and on democratic life. 
Immunology is more likely to have an impact on human well–being than Glottology 
and Social Sciences more likely than Crystallography to have an impact on 
democratic life. Furthermore, while we fully accept that knowledge is valuable from 
the point of view of human development and of democracy, we also believe that it is 
important to realize that the impact of knowledge depends on causal chains that can 
be rather long and complex and that often produce their results only in the medium or 
long term. Both the qualifications that we suggest are meant as an invitation to assess 
the marginal contribution of different disciplines realistically and in view of the 
broader context that mediates their translation into results effectively available to the 
public that can benefit from them. So we recommend that the magnitude, the 
conditions and the time–scale of the impact of various types of knowledge on human 
development or on democracy be carefully considered in order to achieve a sensible 
weighing of these values. In order to highlight the need of such contingent evaluation 
of relevance, in table 4 we have put philanthropic and democratic values in grey. 
It is now time to offer to our readers a practical tool. On the basis of our ideas of 
community sustainability and worthiness, and of our analysis of the values relevant in 
academic publishing, we are constructing a table of technical desiderata. These 
desiderata are the features of a publishing model relevant for achieving both 
community sustainability and worthiness. They will not always all be relevant, but 
they represent a checklist of the characteristics that promoters need to consider. Their 
relative importance and weight will depend on the practices and needs of the research 
area covered by the journal, and on the objectives of the promoters. We cannot 
therefore offer any general ranking: this is a task that needs to be performed in 
context, with knowledge of the particular realities and aspirations of the community 
and of the promoters.  
These desiderata are the specific features through which the general values indicated 
above can be implemented and become operational. So they represent the point where 
abstract values can be translated into realities. Moreover, they represent functional 
parts of a working publishing model, and as such they also need to satisfy 
requirements of functionality and viability that are determined by the working of the 
publishing process as a whole. In short they are the points where the aspirations 
(desiderata) become functional requirements (technical specifications). We believe 
that it is a fairly comprehensive list; however we invite users to modify (either 
expanding or shrinking) it on the basis of the circumstances under which they operate. 
It is offered more as a useful example than as a rigid grid.  
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Table 5: Technical desiderata (TD) table 
 
 
 
 
 
Publishing 
model 
A. 
Quality 
control 
barriers 
B.  
OA to 
publications 
C. Fair access to publishing D. Visibility E. 
Content 
usability 
F. 
Authorship 
and work 
protection 
Absence 
of 
financial 
barriers 
Absence of 
quality-
independent 
caps to 
publication 
Acceptance-
publication 
gap 
Indexing Archiving 
stability 
X         
Y         
Z         
 
Goals and values expressed by the various parameters: 
TD–A: Goal: selecting what is worth publishing. Values: efficiency (reduction of 
noise), scholarly values 
TD–B: Goal: promoting the broadest circulation of knowledge. Values: efficiency, 
fairness, philanthropic values, democratic values 
TD–C: Goal: securing that all that is worth publishing is published promptly. Values: 
fairness, efficiency (quick impact) 
TD–D: Goal: securing that the target audience can reach the publications they need. 
Values: Efficiency, fairness 
TD–E: Goal: promoting the further production and impact of knowledge. Values: 
efficiency, philanthropic values 
TD–F: Goal: preventing abuses and undeserved rewards; protecting the integrity and 
securing that the meaning of works is not distorted. Values: scholarly virtues, fairness 
TD–G: Goal: enabling an accurate and article–specific evaluation of quality and 
impact. Values: fairness (more accurate evaluation of merit), efficiency (more precise 
selection of most valuable contributions) 
Notice that focus on OA is directly concerned only with B and E, although often A is 
discussed as well in response to worries about the compatibility between OA and the 
peer review process.  
Notice that parameters E and F are the only two in a straightforwardly antagonistic 
relation: one can only be promoted by limiting the other, so that they are inversely 
proportional. However, that does not mean that the truly important use rights and 
copyrights protection are incompatible. It is therefore advisable to consider them with 
the aim of understanding where the best balance can be achieved, since we cannot 
improve the score of one without worsening that of the other (but we may well have a 
compromise that allow the uses that we deem important while protecting authors and 
their work in the respects that really count).  
 
7. How to use the framework 
The table of technical desiderata is the keystone of our framework and can be used in 
many different ways. We will illustrate some possible uses of the table, from the 
simpler and more informal to the more formalized and sophisticated. Here again we 
expect promoters to have quite different needs and opportunities as well as quite 
different resources and time. So according to how much choice they have, how much 
is at stake and how much time and resources they are prepared to invest in selecting a 
publishing model they can work out the most appropriate use of the framework. 
 
7.1 The framework as an informal checklist 
	   11	  
The simpler and most informal use of the framework consists in making a list of the 
publishing models available to the journal and in considering how they fare by the 
various parameters listed in table 5. Going through this exercise may be enough to 
make explicit all the relevant differences between the available options and to 
appreciate their strengths and weaknesses. It definitely helps in showing the trade–
offs between different desiderata that are involved in choosing one model rather than 
alternative options. For small journals with limited options, this may be enough to 
make an informed choice. In these cases it is advisable to run a financial sustainability 
check before starting this exercise, in order to narrow down the options to evaluate. 
 
 
7.2 The framework as a guide towards a set of thresholds 
The next step towards a decision more systematic than the informal approach 
suggested above consists in looking at the framework and singling out those 
parameters that are particularly relevant for the promoters. It is quite likely that the 
reasons for launching a journal or for changing its publishing model find expression 
in some of the parameters in table 5. So suppose that the promoters single out 3 or 4 
parameters as crucial for achieving their objectives, and then they have to establish 
for each of them what is the minimal level that a publishing model must satisfy in 
order to be an eligible option. The threshold can be described in natural language or 
through their ‘natural’ metrics. Here by natural metrics we intend units of measures 
like money for financial barriers, months for acceptance–publication gaps, how many 
years an archive can guarantee to host a publication etc. Examples of descriptions in 
natural language are, for instance, ‘we do not want anything less than blind peer 
review by 2 referees for each article,’ ‘articles should be freely available on the 
journal website no later than one year from publication,’ etc. 
Once the relevant thresholds have been set, promoters should make a list of available 
publishing models and check which of them, if any, passes the thresholds. In terms of 
table 2, this means determining set C (worthy options). Once this is done, promoters 
can move on to check which worthy options pass a financial sustainability test and a 
community sustainability test. Now this last test poses more problems than the 
worthiness test, because the information necessary to establish worthiness is available 
to the promoters (it is information about their objectives, and they must know them or 
be able to work them out), while information about key stakeholders is not 
immediately available to them. However, remember that we have noticed that 
typically the promoters are a subset of the key stakeholders. So the simpler solution 
would be to consider themselves a representative sample of the key stakeholders and 
work out the relevant information through reflection, so as to establish community 
acceptance thresholds for the parameters in table 5. The most demanding solution 
would be to carry out a proper survey among key stakeholders. (Of course in between 
these extremes there are a host of intermediate possibilities, for instance an informal 
survey among colleagues.)  
The procedure illustrated so far has been to work out C (see table 2), and then move 
to determining F or E and finally G. The order depends on the cost of getting the 
necessary information. It is advisable always to start with the tests that are less 
demanding, so as to save time and effort in case every option fails the tests that are 
more easily carried out. The principle is always to move along the line of lowest 
resistance, where resistance is understood as the costs (broadly construed, i.e. not only 
in terms of money but also of time and work). When the information needed for 
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establishing thresholds for community sustainability is easily accessible it is advisable 
not to split the process and construct an aggregate table of thresholds that includes 
both worthiness and community sustainability thresholds. Such a comprehensive table 
will allow us to determine E (see table 2) if we have not performed the financial 
sustainability analysis before, while if we had and restricted the options accordingly 
(i.e. if we are working within set A), it will take us straight to G.  
To summarize, table 2 will help us in deciding in which order to proceed and which 
subset to aim at first, while table 5 will guide us in identifying the population of B, C, 
D, E, F, G (notice that we will not need to identify the population of every subset, 
which subsets we need to discover depends on the order in which we proceed. E.g. if 
we start by identifying A, and then we use an aggregate thresholds table we move 
directly to G).  
This approach can be described as proceeding by eliminating options that do not 
satisfy one of the 3 fundamental criteria of evaluation (those stated in table 1) and will 
lead us to identifying the set G of satisfying options. In most cases we believe that this 
is all that is needed and that this can be achieved at a reasonable cost (in terms of time 
and effort).  
 
7.3 The framework as a guide to parameter–specific ordinal rankings 
We believe that ordinal and cardinal rankings may be worth performing only after the 
set of thresholds has been constructed and G has been found populated by 2 or more 
publishing models. Here we explore ordinal rankings, which are much simpler than 
cardinal, although they do not guarantee a determined and clear result. 
On the basis of our assumptions all publishing models in G are considered viable and 
satisfying options, but it is not clear which one is the best choice. The first step 
towards making a decision is to rank the parameters of table 5. It is fundamental to 
make clear that here we are not interested in an abstract ranking, but we need to rank 
how important it is to improve on each parameter once the threshold has been 
reached. The exercise of establishing thresholds is based on the assumption that all 
parameters are important, indeed that reaching the threshold is a necessary condition 
for either the viability or the desirability of the journal: it is as if in a 0–1 scale of 
importance they all count as 1 until the threshold has been reached.22 But once the 
threshold level has been achieved, it makes sense to ask: how important is it to 
improve above the required minimum? But there is another important question to 
consider: are the publishing models in G different in all parameters or only in some? 
If there are some parameters on which there are no differences, then obviously we do 
not have to rank these parameters and we can simplify our task. Suppose that all our 
models in G have the same quality control and the same type of licensing, so that 
there are no differences in TD–A, TD–E, and TD–F. It follows that we need to rank 
only TD–B, TD–C, TD–D, and TD–G. At this point we need to consider two different 
questions in ranking them.  
1. We begin with a factual and contingent question. Remember that we are now 
concerned only with parameters for which there is variability in G. Let us call 
them VG–parameters. For each VG–parameter we ask: how much variability 
is there among the publishing models we are considering? So for each VG–
parameter we have to look at how large is the difference between the 2 
publishing models that present the greater difference and ask: how significant 
is this difference? We can use a very simple scale: a) moderately significant; 
b) fairly significant; and c) very significant.  
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2. We then move to a more abstract and subjective question. For each remaining 
parameter we ask: how important is it for us? Here again we can use a very 
simple scale: a) of limited importance; b) fairly important; and c) very 
important. 
Now let us give a numerical value to a), b), and c) according to the following 
table. 
             Table 6: scores for weighing parameters  
 1 (range of 
variability) 
2 (value) 
a) 0.33 0.33 
b) 0.66 0.66 
c) 1 1 
 
Every parameter will have two scores, by multiplying which we establish its weight. 
For instance, suppose that the VG parameters are TD–B, TD–C, and TD–D and that 
we have the following results (where the first letter indicates the score in variability 
and the second the score in value): TD–B: (b,b = 0.435); TD–C (c,b = 0.66); and TD–
D (b,a = 0.217)  
So our ranking will be: 1st TD–C, 2nd TD–B, and 3rd TD–D. (Notice that we have not 
only a ranking, but also a numerical interval that gives us an idea of how much 
difference in importance there is. Having used a very simple scale with only 3 
possible scores, we are only capturing differences of a certain magnitude, if one wants 
a finer grained measure of the interval one needs to use a finer graded scale of 
scores.)23 
Now we need to rank how the publishing models (let us call them X, Y and Z) 
perform on each VG–parameter, in our example TD–B, TD–C, and TD–D. So 
suppose that we rank them as follows: 
Table 7: ranking example 
 TD–C TD–B TD–D 
1st Z X Y 
2nd X Z X 
3rd Y Y Z 
 
This table helps us in seeing how well the publishing models perform relatively to 
each other, but there is no guarantee that it will provide any clear answer to our 
question: which of the models in G is actually the best for us? 
In our example it shows that one of the 3 is the least preferable (Y), but the question 
remains open whether Z or X is best.  
The most interesting question is whether the result of this ranking procedure is worth 
the effort of producing it. First, let us not to be too influenced by our example and 
remember that we may have had both a clearer result (e.g. if X and Z swap position in 
TD–C, see table 7b below) and an even more ambiguous one (if Y had been 2nd in C 
and B, see table 7c below). How helpful would such results be? 
 
Table 7b: (clear result)  
 TD–C TD–B TD–D 
1st X X Y 
2nd Z Z X 
3rd Y Y Z 
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Table 7c: (very ambiguous result) 
 TD–C TD–B TD–D 
1st Z X Y 
2nd Y Y X 
3rd X Z Z 
 
In every case they give us some interesting information: 7a tells us that Y should not 
be our choice and that X and Z are roughly equivalent. 7b gives us a winner (X), 
while 7c tells us that overall our 3 options are roughly equally desirable: no option 
will be significantly worse overall. 
That said, we think that the opportunity of constructing an ordinal ranking table very 
much depends on two considerations. First we should consider whether after having 
constructed the thresholds (as described in 7b) the promoters have strongly conflicting 
preferences about the models in G. Second we should consider how much effort it 
would require for them to construct the ranking. The latter question depends on how 
many options there are in G, on how many parameters they differ and how large a 
sample of the promoters is needed to represent fairly accurately their preferences. It 
may also be helpful to keep in mind that the exercise of ranking may provide enough 
information even before it is completed. For instance, suppose that during the first 
stage, that of ranking the parameters we realize that the range of variability is 
moderately significant for all the parameters (or for all but one that has low 
importance). Then we may decide that there is not much at stake in our choice and 
decide that it is not worthwhile to proceed any further and make instead a random 
decision. Or suppose that we realize that only one parameter has a high score (say 1 or 
0.66) and all the others very low scores (0.217 at most). Then we may decide that it is 
enough to make the ranking for the one high scoring parameter.  
In short, when promoters have several satisfying options, but they feel that the choice 
is not indifferent and something important may be at stake, it is advisable at least to 
begin the ranking exercise, although it may not turn out to be necessary to complete it.  
 
7.4 The framework as the basis for weighed parameters and cardinal 
standardized evaluations 
Suppose that we have carried out our ordinal ranking and that we have achieved a 
situation like that illustrated in table 7c, and among the promoters there is persistent 
disagreement about the choice of the best publishing model. Is there a way of helping 
them to find out which is the rational choice? In order to do so we need to help them 
to construct cardinal rather than ordinal evaluations of each model. This means that 
we have to construct a table in which each model receives a numerical score for every 
VG–parameter and these numerical scores are adjusted for importance and variability 
magnitude. Can this be done in a reasonably simple way? In the following part of this 
section we describe what seems to us the simpler way to construct reasonably reliable 
cardinal evaluations. Whether it is simple and reliable enough we leave to readers and 
to promoters to judge. We are not committed to the idea that a formal decision 
making procedure based on numerical scores is superior to an informal, but well–
informed, choice. The kind of choice that we are tackling is not based on physical 
features that are measurable objectively; it is instead based on attempts to give 
numerical scores to preferences (or, if you prefer, to values) and this is by no means 
as precise and as impartial a procedure as we would like. Whether such methods 
provide any genuine advantage over an informal deliberation depends on how 
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acceptable and significant are the simplifications and idealizations involved in the 
process and this cannot be decided by a formal procedure, but only by an informal 
evaluation. In practice, we suggest that if promoters have carried out a parameter–
specific ordinal ranking, but this has not indicated the best option clearly, then they 
need to ask themselves whether they want to make their decision on the basis of the 
general information provided by the framework (as described in 7a) or whether they 
want to embark in the construction of cardinal evaluation explained below. We do not 
believe that it is irrational to opt for the former method.24  
So let us go back to our problem of constructing cardinal evaluations. Our task is 
considerably simplified if the models that populate G are not differing in all 
parameters, i.e. if the VG–parameters are fewer than the seven parameters considered 
in table 5 (technical desiderata). So we start by constructing a table that includes only 
the VG–parameters. The other piece of good news is that we have already established 
minimal thresholds for every parameter. In fact we have established more than one 
minimal threshold: a worthiness threshold (the threshold to be passed in order to be 
part of set C in table 2) and a community sustainability threshold (the threshold to be 
passed in order to be part of set B in table 2). What we need to use now is the 
threshold to be passed in order to be part of set E (defined by the overlap between B 
and C). This E threshold is simply the higher between the 2 thresholds mentioned. 
These E thresholds are our bottom lines, and (as in section 7.3 above) we are 
interested in assessing the significance of improvements above this bottom line.  
Our next task is to establish for every VG–parameter an upper threshold as well. The 
upper threshold marks the point at which we are no longer interested in improving on 
that parameter. In technical terms this is the point where the utility curve for a 
parameter becomes flat. For instance, suppose that for both promoters and key 
stakeholders double double–blind peer review (plus, if needed, a third double–blind 
peer review) represents as good a quality control as one may wish and that any further 
quality control is not perceived to add anything significant. And suppose that full OA 
at the time of publication of the best version of the article is all that can be asked in 
terms of OA to publications. Then these would be our higher thresholds for 
parameters TD–A and TD–B. Clearly it is possible that the lower threshold and the 
upper threshold coincide. For instance it is perfectly conceivable that double double–
blind peer review and full OA to the best version at the moment of publication are 
also considered minimum thresholds. However, this will not be the case for VG–
parameters, for by definitions these are parameters for which there is significant 
variation above the threshold. Once we have established a lower and upper threshold 
and these two do not coincide we have determined what we call the range of relevant 
variability (henceforth RRV). That is what we need to establish for all our VG–
parameters. At this point we will give a score of 0 to the bottom threshold and a score 
of 1 to the top threshold.  
Since in respect to each VG–parameter we have already ranked the publishing models 
in G (let us called them G–models for brevity) now we only need to place them on the 
0–1 scale delimited by the bottom and top thresholds. What is important here is to 
establish the correct intervals. How do we move from a simple ranking to establishing 
the intervals? A fairly simple way is by using a visual analogue scale. For each VG–
parameter we need to single out the G–models that present between them the shorter 
and the larger intervals and then place them on a visual scale (e.g. a 10 cm long, 
graded vertical line). See figure 1 below.  
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At this point we need to add any remaining (if any) G–models and place them 
according to our ranking. We now have a provisional interval scaling that we need to 
refine by comparing each interval with all others until we reach a scale that we 
believe faithfully reflects the desirability gaps between the options. When we have 
achieved this result we can convert the spatial distance into a numerical interval and 
this gives us cardinal scores for each G–model for a given parameter.  
 
Figure 1: Visual analogue scale 
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   0.9       
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   0.8       
          G-model Z   
   0.7 
 
   0.6 
 
   0.5 
 
   0.4 
          G-model X 
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   0.1 
          G-model W 
Bottom threshold 0 
 
 
At this point we need to add any remaining (if any) G–models and place them 
according to our ranking. We now have a provisional interval scaling that we need to 
refine by comparing each interval with all others until we reach a scale that we 
believe faithfully reflects the desirability gaps between the options. When we have 
achieved this result we can convert the spatial distance into a numerical interval and 
this gives us cardinal scores for each G–model for a given parameter.  
Now we have to construct these scores for every VG–parameter. Once we have done 
this we only have to multiply these scores by the importance coefficient of each VG–
parameter. Remember that we have attributed to each VG–parameter a variability 
score and value score (see table 6 above and footnote 23) and by multiplying one for 
the other we have worked out the importance coefficient of each VG–parameter. 
Once we have multiplied parameter–specific scores by the coefficient of importance 
we have standardized them, i.e. we have made them commensurable. So now we only 
have to sum the standardized parameter–specific scores of each G–model in order to 
calculate their overall score. The G–model with the highest overall score is the best 
available option.  
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8. An example of application 
Suppose that a group of scientists and scholars wants to launch a new journal. They 
come from a variety of disciplines ranging from natural sciences (biology, chemistry) 
to humanities (history, philosophy), from applied disciplines (medical sciences, 
engineering) to social sciences (STS, economics). They want to have a forum for 
discussing the practical and methodological issues stemming from trans–disciplinary 
collaboration; accordingly the journal will be called Perspectives on Trans–
disciplinary Integration. Because of their diverse backgrounds they have different 
publishing cultures and needs. Table 5 will greatly help them immediately to put into 
focus some of the issues that they will have to tackle. Suppose that they all agree on 
the type of peer review they want and that it would be a very good thing for the 
journal to be OA. But as they move on through the list differences begin to emerge. 
Humanists are strongly adverse to Article Processing Charges because they do not 
have funds to cover these costs, but some of them are not so keen on giving up printed 
publishing. Younger members of the group are very sensitive to the need of having 
the shortest possible gap between acceptance and publication because they are on 
tenure–track or on temporary contracts. Researchers from medical sciences and 
engineering give a lot of importance to very effective indexing so that their target 
audiences will be able to find their contributions. Natural scientists are positive 
towards very liberal licensing, while engineers, medical scientists, social scientists 
and humanists are more worried and want to secure tighter copyright protections, 
albeit for different reasons—humanists and social scientists because they care about 
authorship, researchers from medical and engineering sciences because they are 
concerned about patents and funders demands. Finally, researchers from medical 
sciences and other high impact disciplines are pushing to have article specific metrics, 
so as not to suffer too much from publishing in a journal that will probably have a 
lower IF than their disciplinary journals. Most of these issues will have not been 
stressed if they had discussed only OA. Furthermore the diversity of needs and 
preferences suggests that they will need at least to reflect together on their preferred 
publishing model and possibly that they will need to rank and measure their 
preferences and therefore that they may well take advantage of the tools presented in 
section 7. 
 
9. Conclusions and recommendations 
Digital technologies have brought novelties and new possibilities to academic 
publishing. Some constraints of the printing age have been removed or relaxed. This 
fact, combined with the continuous expansion of academic research and publishing, is 
pushing many scholarly communities to consider the possibility of founding new 
journals or of changing the publishing model of existing journals. This wave of 
change is currently understood as a move towards OA publishing, and there is a 
widespread assumption that OA is good and that editorial boards of new journals or of 
journals changing their publishing model should try to be as open as possible (cf. 
SPARC’s How Open Is It? Guide25). We believe that the emergence of digital 
technologies has brought more meaningful opportunities than are captured by the 
concept of OA alone, even when this is understood, as it should, as Open Access and 
Use. For instance, emphasis on OA tends to overlook a problem intensely felt by 
many academics, namely the very long publishing times of many traditional journals; 
these waiting times could often be cut drastically by moving from a print to a digital–
only publication.26 It seems paradoxical to demand immediate OA while accepting 
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that some journals impose delays longer than 2 years because of their backlogs.27 
Another example is offered by the need of developing article–specific metrics. For 
instance the impact factor (IF) of a journal gives a very inaccurate estimate of the IF 
of each article published in it. Inferring the IF of an article from that of the host 
journal can be compared to inferences that are standardly considered examples of 
poor reasoning, like group thinking (i.e. attributing to individuals the features of a 
group to which they belong; e.g. she is Swiss therefore she is punctual). Digital 
technologies promise to offer corrective to these poor inferences, but such 
possibilities are beyond the concerns of the OA movement. 
Furthermore, we believe that barriers are not necessarily negative: quality barriers in 
academic publishing are nearly universally considered fundamental and the 
desirability of barriers to use aimed at protecting authorship varies across 
disciplines.28 Finally, our experience with the Agora project has shown us that an 
exclusive focus on trying to maximize openness has led to definitions of OA that are, 
in our view, unfairly exclusionary. We have therefore tried to offer a more exhaustive 
map of the values and desiderata important in academic journals publishing. We hope 
that the framework generated by this mapping will be useful for editorial boards 
considering different publishing models. We also believe that our framework helps to 
stimulate a better understanding of the key values in academic publishing. This 
information should be of interest to all those involved in academic publishing and in 
the OA movement. Their strategic and policy choices would benefit from the broader 
point of view offered by the framework. For instance the choices of those agencies 
trying to promote OA should not set standards that may not be met without sacrificing 
other legitimate and important desiderata in academic publishing. Helping academic 
communities to find the best viable publishing model to address their multiple 
desiderata should be the priority, while promoting openness should be pursued within 
the limits afforded by this broader agenda, not as an end in itself. 
 
Appendix. Further analysis of stakeholders values 
In this appendix we report the part of stakeholders analysis that has not revealed any 
value worth including in table 4. Readers may nonetheless be interested in knowing 
why the interests of librarians, publishers and research funders have not been 
represented by any additional value. 
Publishers are either commercial or non–profit. Non–profit publishers do not bring 
into the picture new values: they are supposed to be dedicated to the promotion and 
circulation of knowledge and hence to efficiency, scholarly virtues and fairness. 
Commercial publishers are instead supposed to make a profit as well. There is nothing 
wrong with being able to provide a service (or to produce a good) in such a way that 
makes a profit. In this respect making a profit is like pursuing fame: it is a legitimate 
interest as long as it respects the relevant side–constraints (e.g. fairness). So 
commercial publishers have a legitimate claim to be able to make a profit as long as 
they play within the rules of academic publishing and as long as they respect its 
purpose and values (i.e. those we have illustrated above). But they do not have any 
legitimate right to determine the rules of academic publishing so as to make it a 
profitable activity, at least not when this interferes with the aim and values of the 
practice. This boils down to the very obvious point that when non–profit alternatives 
are not available or not working, commercial publishers are needed and hence they 
have some bargaining power and they will only enter the game if they can make a 
profit. This, in our view, is perfectly legitimate and acceptable. But it is very different 
from claiming that things have to remain so as to allow commercial publishers to 
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make profits, when some changes (e.g. some possibilities afforded by digital 
technologies) may make the process more efficient in serving the value of knowledge 
production and circulation. Let us illustrate the point with an analogy.  
Suppose that most of the elderly who need care are looked after by their families. 
Some elderly people have no caring families. Charitable, non–profit organizations 
manage to look after some of these elderly people. Among the elderly who need care 
and have no caring families, some can pay for the care they need. Obviously it is 
perfectly legitimate for commercial companies to provide this service and make a 
profit from it. But suppose that charitable organizations find a way of providing their 
services much more efficiently and are now able to care for all the elderly without 
caring families. This would drive commercial organizations out of the business, but 
they would have no claim that they are entitled to make a profit and that therefore, 
say, charitable organizations should be prevented from adopting the new management 
strategy that enables them to serve all the elderly. Similarly, commercial publishers 
have no claim that academic publishing should be organized or subject to legal 
regulations so as to make possible for them to make a profit. In short, if commercial 
publishers provide indispensable services, they will have the bargaining power to 
negotiate conditions that enable them to make a profit, but if they are not 
indispensable there is no reason why they should be entitled to dictate conditions that 
enable them to make a profit. We believe that this amounts to saying that commercial 
publishers have no ethical claim about the conditions to be imposed on non–
commercial publishing. If there is a market for academic publishing the commercial 
publishers are free to try their luck in this market, but if the market shrinks or 
disappears, then tough luck. 
Things are not very different when it comes to librarians. Their activity is defined by 
the function of serving the preservation and distribution of knowledge. As long as 
they perform this task efficiently and successfully, they are entitled to appropriate 
recognition, rewards (including financial rewards) etc. So as long as their services are 
needed, publishing should not undermine their profession and their ability to perform 
their valuable function. But if, say, new technologies bring about deep 
transformations in the storage and circulation of knowledge, this is just tough luck for 
the librarians. It is their task to adapt to changed circumstances; they cannot claim that 
other actors forfeit, say, some gains in efficiency in order to preserve the current role 
of librarians.29  
Things are different when we consider research funders. It seems quite reasonable to 
claim that funders should be entitled to have a say about the kind of knowledge that 
they are interested in funding and about the ways in which it should be disseminated. 
It seems hard to deny that the simple principle that ‘who pays the piper picks the tune’ 
has some force. To be sure, that does not mean that funders should be allowed to 
interfere with the principles that govern research and its criteria of scientific or 
scholarly validity. Furthermore, both in science and in scholarship there is a well–
established epistemological requirement that results be made public and open to 
public scrutiny and criticism (at least by experts in the relevant field of knowledge). 
From this it seems to follow that funders do not have a prerogative to hinder or 
prevent these forms of open scrutiny. If the purpose of research is the pursuit and 
dissemination of knowledge, any action or restriction that obstructs the pursuit and 
circulation of knowledge contradicts the purpose of research and hence is a pragmatic 
contradiction (i.e. it is inconsistent with the stated purpose of promoting research). So 
a funder seems to have a legitimate prerogative in deciding to fund Pathology rather 
than Histology, or Greek Philology rather than Sociology; but they do not have a 
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prerogative to decide that the knowledge they have funded should be disclosed only to 
people over 50 years old or only to institutions based in countries lying north of the 
14th parallel. Luckily, recently funders have actually been pushing in the direction of 
promoting a wider circulation of the research they fund and have taken the initiative 
to remove some barriers to the circulation and use of knowledge.30 This seems a 
completely acceptable demand, which is open to question not in terms of principle but 
only in terms of the most effective strategies for achieving this result.31 However, here 
the bottom line is that funders’ claims are valid only when they are consistent and 
compatible with the values that we have already pointed out and this is true also when 
we deal with the claim of ownership. Results that are kept hidden pervert the pursuit 
of knowledge and lose their status as genuine pieces of knowledge. Unfortunately 
they also affect the status of the knowledge that is disclosed, as is well exemplified by 
the problem of the non–publication of negative results (a notorious problem with 
medical trials funded by pharmaceutical companies).32 To put it roughly the principle 
of ownership cannot be applied to research in any way that undermines the practices 
of epistemic validation and refutation. 
We thus come to the conclusion that looking at the interests of publishers, librarians 
and funders we do not find any new relevant value that should be upheld in academic 
publishing. This does not mean that the claims of these stakeholders should be 
dismissed or ignored. It simply means that their claims have weight when they can be 
convincingly put in terms of the values relevant to academic publishing, or at least 
compatible and supportive of these values. So, for instance, as long as libraries are a 
necessary medium in the preservation and circulation of knowledge, their needs are 
relevant.33 
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5See Directory of Open Access Journals (DOAJ), http://doaj.org/(Accessed May 4, 2014) and 
Open Access Scholarly Publishers Association (OASPA), http://oaspa.org/ (Accessed May 4, 
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6What we are claiming is simply that to most academics who are not especially involved with 
digital technologies OA is the most visible issue around digital technologies. The large echo 
of recent initiatives like the Finch Report, the Academic Spring as well as events like Aaron 
Schwartz’s suicide have brought a lot of attention on OA and made it a popular topic for 
discussion. The Finch Report is available through the Research Information Network, 
http://www.researchinfonet.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Finch-Group-report-FINAL-
VERSION.pdf (Accessed May 4, 2014); for a good starting point and useful links on the 
Academic Spring see Eliza Anyangwe, “A (free) roundup of content on the Academic 
Spring,” Higher Education Network, The Guardian, April 12, 2012 
http://www.theguardian.com/higher-education-network/blog/2012/apr/12/blogs-on-the-
academic-spring (Accessed May 4, 2014); for an example of how Schwartz’s suicide brought 
attention to OA issues see Andrea Peterson, “Will Aaron Schwartz’s Suicide Make the Open-
Access Movement Mainstream?,” Slate, January 13, 2013 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2013/01/13/aaron_swartz_s_suicide_may_make_the
_open_access_movement_mainstream.html (Accessed May 5, 2014). No other issue around 
digital technologies in academic publishing has had a comparable visibility and media 
coverage. Even such a broad-ranging book as Martin Weller’s The Digital Scholar: How 
Technology is Transforming Scholarly Practice (London: Bloomsbury, 2011) 
http://www.bloomsburyacademic.com/view/DigitalScholar_9781849666275/book-ba-
9781849666275.xml;jsessionid=2229AEFD55A03FC84798F39CAB80FEE5 (Accessed May 
5, 2014) in its chapter on publishing (chapter 12) focuses on Open Access. 
7On the importance of open use and on the difference (and complementarity) between gratis 
OA (i.e. removal of price barrier) and libre OA, see Peter Suber, Open Access (Cambridge 
Ma: MIT Press, 2013), 4–6. 
8For a similar argument cf. Alice Bell, “Beyond Open Access: Understanding Science’s 
Closures,” The Guardian, November 18, 2013, 
www.theguardian.com/science/2013/nov/18/beyond-open-access-understanding-sciences-
enclosures (Accessed May 5, 2014). See also Ellen Collins, “Why Open Access Isn’t Enough 
in Itself,” Higher Education Network, The Guardian, August 14, 2013, 
www.theguardian.com/higher-education-network/blog/2013/aug/14/open-access-media-
coverage-research (Accessed May 5, 2014). 
9As Weller writes, “the ostensible aim is to remove (not just reduce) barriers to access” 
(Weller, The Digital Scholar, chapter 12). As noted above, policies like the DOAJ decision to 
exclude any form of delayed OA also betray an uncompromising attitude. SPARC’s now 
popular diagram How Open Is It? 
(http://www.sparc.arl.org/sites/default/files/hoii_guide_rev4_web.pdf [Accessed May 4, 
2014]) also implicitly suggests that people should try to get as closer as possible to the top of 
the openness scale.  
10A large survey by Taylor and Francis/Routledge shows that authors believe that ability to 
publish should not depend on ability to pay; Will Frass, Jo Cross and Victoria Gardner, Open 
Access Survey: Exploring the Views of Taylor and Francis and Routledge Authors (London: 
Taylor and Francis, 2013), 7 http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals/explore/Open-Access-Survey-
March2013.pdf (Accessed May 4, 2014). In a survey we conducted among NWR authors, 28 
out 46 respondents chose the answer “I would never pay nor have my institution pay Open 
Access fees,” and less than 15 were prepared to pay a fee. 
11Of course we neither mean to suggest that predatory publishers and commercial publishers 
are on a par, nor we have any hostile intentions towards the latter. Nevertheless, here we are 
not interested in journals as profit opportunities, but in journals as services to the 
scholarly/scientific community. There are examples of interests that may pervert the mission 
of academic publishing. Probably the most striking example is the attempt by pharmaceutical 
industry to exercise a control on the publication process in some areas of biomedical science. 
12The reasons why we call it worthiness are explained in section 5 below. 
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13One can see community sustainability as the set of conditions that a journal addressing—and 
counting on—a specific community needs to meet, while worthiness as the objectives that a 
specific journal—with its distinctive mission—aims to realize. 
14Nevertheless, in section 7b we take advantage of the possibility of handling worthiness and 
community sustainability one at a time to make things simpler. 
15Knowledge is clearly the principal value in Merton’s description of the ethos of science; see 
Robert Merton,  “The Normative Structure of Science,” reprinted in Merton, The Sociology of 
Science, Norman W. Storer, ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973). Many have 
criticized his account as very idealistic and very few would accept it today, but that does not 
mean that the ideal of the pursuit of knowledge has disappeared from science.For a recent 
example of its enduring importance see, for instance, Alma Swan,  “Open Access and the 
Progress of Science,” American Scientist 95, May-June (2007), 198–200 
http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/263860/1/American_Scientist_article.pdf (Accessed May 4, 2014). 
16Still there are different views on the value of Knowledge: for instance it can be seen either 
as having intrinsic value, or as having instrumental value, or both. 
17Here the equality of opportunities is understood in a narrow sense: namely as equality of 
opportunity among those who have received the education and training that make them 
capable of contributing scholarly work. It is not understood in the broader sense, required by 
some theories of social justice—like Rawls’s theory, for instance; see John Rawls, A Theory 
of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971)—that every citizen is given fair 
equality of opportunities to pursue their favourite course of life. In other words, it is fair 
equality of opportunities within academia, not within society. 
18I use the concept of human development because of its breadth, current popularity and its 
applicability to both individuals and communities. The loci classici for a detailed account of 
the concept are Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1999) and Martha Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Approach 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011).  
19This argument is often found in the literature that advocates OA; typically in relation to the 
benefit of OA for developing countries. See for instance the Salvador Declaration on Open 
Access: The Developing World Perspective 
(http://www.icml9.org/meetings/openaccess/public/documents/declaration.htm) and the 
OASIS page on Open Access and Developing Countries 
(http://www.openoasis.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=28&Itemid=41
2), which also provides a useful bibliography on this topic. 
20We have not found an explicit version of this argument, however the final report of the 
UNESCO Netherlands Expert Meeting on Open Access 
(http://www.unesco.org/new/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/HQ/CI/CI/pdf/themes/access_to_kno
wledge_societies/open_access/en%20-
%20UNESCO%20expert%20meeting%20Open%20Access%20conclusions.pdf) suggests a 
possible argument along these lines when it describes OA as “an instrument for realizing the 
rights to share in scientific advancement and its benefits, to education and to information 
(articles 27, 26, and 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights respectively).” 
21Cf. Michael Parker, “The Ethics of Open Access Publishing,” BMC Medical Ethics 14, no. 
16 (2013). For an overview of the importance of public participation and involvement in 
policy-making see Maarten A. Hajer and Hendrik Wagenaar (eds.), Deliberative Policy 
Analysis. Understanding Governance in the Network Society (Cambridge UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003). 
22This is true even if all actual publishing models satisfy a certain parameter. This simply 
means that the threshold is so easy to satisfy that it is in practice a non-exclusionary 
parameter. If this is the case, we can simply remove it from the table for it does not play any 
practical role in our choice, but this does not pose any conceptual challenge to our approach. 
23A scale with 5 options (e.g. 1. Marginal [0.1]; 2. Moderate [0.3]; 3. Fair [0.5]; 4. Significant 
[0.7]; 5. Very important [0.9]) will already provide a much finer graded measurement of 
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differences and more precise tracking of intervals. We recommend these finer graded scales 
when parameters importance and variability is measured in the context of the cardinal 
evaluations described in the next section (7d). 
24The theoretical reason for not considering the ‘informal’ option inferior is that we do not 
consider given preferences as perfectly rational and immutable. The informal deliberative 
method allows for the reflective modification of preferences, while the formal method does 
not. Hence the informal method has at least one important advantage. 
25http://www.sparc.arl.org/sites/default/files/hoii_guide_rev4_web.pdf (Accessed May 4, 
2014). 
26Yet some people (especially in the humanities) still prefer to have a printed version of the 
journal as well. For instance, NWR has a small and unexpected number of individual 
subscriptions to the print version. 
27A good example of how long publications delay can be and how serious a problem they are 
for authors can be found in a discussion in Brian Leiter’s blog, Leiter Reports: A Philosophy 
Blog, “Open Access Journals in Philosophy: Why Aren't There More, and More Better 
Ones?” http://leiterreports.typepad.com/blog/2009/06/open-access-journals-in-philosophy-
why-arent-there-more-and-more-better-ones.html (Accessed May 4, 2014). See comment 13 
by Mark Schroeder. 
28Most advocates of OA fully acknowledge the need of quality barriers and stress that OA is 
compatible with peer review; for instance Suber in his Open Access begins a section entitled 
“What OA is not” writing that “OA isn’t an attempt to bypass peer review” (p. 20). We are 
not suggesting that OA is against quality controls, but that it considers them an ad hoc 
exception to their intention to remove barriers.  
Concerning authors’ rights, Nigel Vincent for instance argues that in the humanities (and to a 
lesser extent also in the social sciences) the writing and the organisation and exposition of the 
content are themselves an essential feature of the scholarly work, so that authors often prefer 
licenses that do not allow derivatives (ND). See Nigel Vincent, “The Monograph Challenge,” 
in Debating Open Access, eds. Nigel Vincent and Chris Wickham (London: The British 
Academy, 2013), 110–1, https://www.britac.ac.uk/openaccess/debatingopenaccess.cfm 
(Accessed May 4, 2014). Translations provide another example of derivatives for which in 
the humanities there are good reasons for wanting restrictions.  
29Of course there is nothing wrong if they decide to renounce some advantages in order not to 
undermine the role of librarians. But this is, technically speaking, a supererogatory act and 
not a duty. Actually from the point of view of the efficient generation and dissemination of 
knowledge this may be an inefficient course of action that should be justified in terms of 
some other value, for instance the well-being of librarians and their families.  
30See the list of OA mandates provided by ROARMAP (http://roarmap.eprints.org); Suber, 
Open Access, chapter 4 is also helpful and gives many useful references and links. 
31We come back to this issue in the concluding section of the article. 
32See for instance Daniele Fanelli, “Negative Results are Disappearing from Most Disciplines 
and Countries,” Scientometrics 90, no. 3 (2012), and Sergio Sismondo, “Pharmaceutical 
company funding and its consequences: A qualitative systematic review,” Contemporary 
Clinical Trials, 29, no. 2 (2008).  
33From a practical point of view, though, these are interests that need to be considered 
at the level of policy making, not by promoters. 
